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Based on a review of the literature and on reports by people with autism, this paper
suggests that atypical resource allocation is a factor that contributes to many aspects
of autism spectrum conditions, including difﬁculties with language and social cognition,
atypical sensory and attentional experiences, executive and motor challenges, and
perceptual and conceptual strengths and weaknesses. Drawing upon resource theoretical
approaches that suggest that perception, cognition, and action draw upon multiple pools of
resources, the approach hypothesizes that compared with resources in typical cognition,
resources in autism are narrowed or reduced, especially in people with strong sensory
symptoms. In narrowed attention, resources are restricted to smaller areas and to fewer
modalities, stages of processing, and cognitive processes than in typical cognition;
narrowed resources may be more intense than in typical cognition. In reduced attentional
capacity, overall resources are reduced; resources may be restricted to fewer modalities,
stages of processing, and cognitive processes than in typical cognition, or the amount of
resources allocated to each area or process may be reduced. Possible neural bases of the
hypothesized atypical resource allocation, relations to other approaches, limitations, and
tests of the hypotheses are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
It was as if either my ears worked or my voice did but not at the same time.
When I spoke, I heard noise but was deaf to most of the meaning I was
making. I had to take it on trust that I was making meaning at all. . ..
My brain was like a department store where the people running different
departments were working alternate shifts. When one came to work, the
others went to sleep. . ..
Williams (1994, pp. 95–96)
This account by Donna Williams, an autistic author, suggests a
resource theory of autism, in which the processing of perception,
action, and meaning is affected by limited neural resources. Of
course, for autistic and neurotypical people alike, our theories
of how our brains work may be wrong – we have access to our
experience but not to the neural or psychological underpinnings
of that experience. And given the great heterogeneity of people
with autism, what is true of one autistic person’s brain may not
be true of another’s. But what if her metaphor is correct? Can
resource theoretical approaches contribute to our understanding
of autism? This paper will develop one such approach, proposing
that atypical resource allocation, which may be present to a greater
or lesser extent in different people with autism, can be seen as a
factor that ties together seemingly disparate symptoms and aspects
of autism1.
Whereas many approaches to autism are centered on the three
symptom areas in the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation, 2000) diagnostic criteria – qualitative impairment in
social interaction, qualitative impairment in communication and
1An earlier version of this approach is detailed in Goldknopf (2006).
imaginative activity, and a restricted repertoire of interests and
activities – a second groupof aspects of autismhas beennoted clin-
ically and experimentally. These include autistic people’s atypical
sensory and attentional responses (e.g., Ornitz and Ritvo, 1968),
movement issues (e.g., Damasio and Maurer, 1978), and unusual
pattern of perceptual and conceptual strengths and weaknesses
(e.g., Frith and Happé, 1994; Plaisted et al., 1998a). A number
of approaches have focused on these other aspects of autism
(e.g., Ornitz, 1989; Minshew and Goldstein, 1998; Plaisted, 2001;
Murray et al., 2005; Happé and Frith, 2006; Mottron et al., 2006;
Bonneh et al., 2008; Donnellan et al., 2013).
Building on this previous work, the present approach empha-
sizes these sensory, attentional, and perceptual/conceptual aspects
of autism spectrum conditions (ASCs) while contributing to an
explanation of the more classic criterial symptoms of autism, such
as difﬁculties with language, social cognition, executive function,
and action2. The approach draws upon resource theories of typ-
ical cognition that suggest that perception, cognition, and action
draw upon a common resource or multiple pools of resources
(e.g., Kahneman, 1973; Navon and Gopher, 1979) and especially
upon Wickens’s multiple-resource approach to typical cognition
Wickens (1980, 1984, 2002, 2008); it hypothesizes that compared
with resources in typical cognition, resources in autism (especially
in people with strong sensory symptoms) are (a) narrowed or (b)
reduced3. In narrowed attention, resources are directed to smaller
2Sensory symptoms are now part of the DSM-V criteria for autism (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013).
3A related hypothesis, “difﬁculty with subordination to a schema” (Goldknopf,
2006), will not be discussed here due to space constraints. That hypothesis states that
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or fewer cortical areas, or to fewer cognitive stages or functions,
than is typical. Attentional narrowing can occur within a sen-
sory modality, between modalities, or within the larger canvas of
cognitive functions and stages of processing. In some modalities,
resources can be literally narrowed: in vision, to a smaller retino-
topic or spatiotopic area; in somatic senses, to a smaller part of
the body. This narrowed attention could be of typical intensity, or
could be atypically intense, as if a typical amount of resources was
being deployed to a smaller area. Resources can also be narrowed to
one modality or cognitive process, or to fewer stages of processing.
In possibility (b), which will be considered more brieﬂy, overall
resources are reduced. This may restrict resources to smaller areas,
fewer modalities, or fewer processes or stages than is typical, or it
may simply reduce the amount of resources allocated to each of
these.
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES
(A) Narrowed Attention
Resources are restricted to smaller areas and to fewer modali-
ties, stages of processing, and cognitive processes than in typical
cognition. Narrowed resources may be more intense than in
typical cognition.
(B) Reduced Attentional Capacity
Overall resources are reduced. This may restrict resources to
fewer modalities, stages of processing, and cognitive processes
than in typical cognition, or it may reduce the amount of
resources allocated to each area.
The approach does not suggest that conscious attention is needed
for all stages of processing, but rather that resources underlying
both attention and certain other aspects of processing in typical
development are allocated atypically in autism. The approach also
does not presume to suggest that atypical resource allocation is the
only or even the primary factor in autism. Given the great hetero-
geneity of people with autism, there is a growing consensus that
autism is multi-factorial, involving multiple genes (e.g., Abrahams
and Geschwind, 2008) as well as possible epigenetic and environ-
mental inﬂuences. Atypical resource allocation is most likely to be
a factor in autistic people with strong sensory symptoms (hypo-
and hypersensitivity).
In this paper, after brieﬂy reviewing work on resource theory
and attention, I will describe the current approach anddiscuss how
it might address various symptoms and aspects of autism. I will
then touch upon possible neural underpinnings of the approach,
possible tests of the approach, limitations, and future directions.
RESOURCES AND ATTENTION
RESOURCE-THEORETICAL APPROACHES
Anumber of theories have attempted to explain perception, cogni-
tion, and action in terms of a pool or pools of resources; some such
theories deﬁne the resource involved as attention. An example is
Kahneman’s (1973) theory, which hypothesized that in addition to
in typical cognition, resources for perceptions and lower-level schemas are decreased
in favor of resources for higher-level schemas; in autism, resources for perceptions
and lower stages may not be decreased in favor of resources for higher ones.
structural constraints, there is a general attentional upper limit on
people’s ability to do mental work, including aspects of perceptual
processing, the planning of action, and cognition; a variety of
factors affect this capacity at any givenmoment. Subsequent exper-
imental work supported the view that performance depends on
multiple pools of resources (e.g., Navon and Gopher, 1979; Wick-
ens, 1980), as will be discussed below. Much research in this area
depends on comparing single-task and dual-task performance and
in examining the amount of interference between tasks of differ-
ent types, degrees of difﬁculty, and degrees of priority (Navon and
Gopher, 1979).
Resource theories have receivedmuch criticism, including some
from their own earlier proponents. It is hard to show that an effect
arises from capacity limitations rather than from other causes. For
example, when people do two tasks at once, each task may create
cross-talk – outputs and side effects that interfere with the other
task (Navon, 1984). In addition, people may switch their attention
back and forth between multiple tasks rather than truly doing
them simultaneously (Pashler and Johnston, 1998).
Despite these criticisms,workon resources has continued, espe-
cially by those concerned with ergonomics/human factors. Based
on a meta-analysis of single- and dual-task experiments, Wick-
ens (1980, 1984, 2002, 2008) has developed a resource theoretical
model in which intersecting pools of resources are divided on
three dimensions, each associated with a broad area of the brain:
stages of processing (perceptual/cognitive vs. action, associated
with processing posterior to or anterior to the central sulcus,
respectively), codes (verbal vs. non-verbal, associated with the left
and right hemispheres, respectively)4, and modalities (auditory
vs. visual, associated with auditory and visual processing areas).
In the most recent “3-D + 1” version, the three dimensions are
supplemented by a distinction between visual channels (focal vs.
ambient vision, associated with ventral and dorsal visual paths,
respectively). Other multiple-resource approaches have focused
on the cerebral hemispheres as independent pools of resources
(e.g., Friedman and Polson, 1981), or, in a ﬁner-grained analy-
sis based on both subjective reports and behavioral studies, posit
more numerous pools of resources (Boles et al., 2007). For present
purposes, Wickens’s broad “3-D + 1” model will be used as a
starting point in discussing resources.
Recent neuroimaging data appear to support the notion of
resource limitations. There is increasing evidence that attention to
one feature, spatial area, or modality is associated with a decrease
in activation of cortical areas associated with other features, spatial
areas, ormodalities (e.g., Corbetta et al., 1990; Shomstein andYan-
tis, 2004). Shomstein and Yantis’s ﬁnding that selective attention
to visual or auditory stimuli led to decreases in fMRI signal for
the unattended modality may indicate that both modalities draw
upon a shared perceptual resource pool, or might reﬂect cross-talk
or inhibition between modalities.
ATTENTION
The present approach also draws on notions of attention. As Pash-
ler (1998) notes, the word attention may refer to a variety of
4This simpliﬁed picture omits prosody, which is largely processed by the right
hemisphere (Bookheimer, 2002).
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phenomena, including selective attention (the gating, exclusionary
process which enables some input to be processed further and
some ignored) and attention conceived as a resource or capacity;
both meanings are relevant to the current approach.
Selective attention can be considered in the context of Posner
and colleagues’ inﬂuential approach, which distinguishes between
three main attentional networks: alerting, orienting, and execu-
tive control (e.g., Posner and Petersen, 1990; Petersen and Posner,
2012). A simple behavioral test, the Attention Networks Test
(ANT; Fan et al., 2002), is frequently used to test the efﬁciency
and independence of the networks.
Work on the orienting network is most relevant here. In
Petersen and Posner’s (2012) approach, the orienting network
is associated with both a dorsal and a ventral system and with
acetylcholine; it is responsible for prioritizing external stimuli by
selecting a location or modality and is usually tested with cued
attentional shifts (e.g., Posner, 1980)5. The dorsal system, involved
in top-down visuospatial orienting, includes dorsal frontal areas,
especially the frontal eye ﬁelds (FEFs), and dorsal parietal areas,
especially the interparietal sulcus; the ventral system, involved in
bottom-up reorienting, includes the right ventral frontal cortex
and temporoparietal junction (Posner and Petersen, 1990; Cor-
betta and Shulman, 2002; Corbetta et al., 2008)6. Though the two
systems work together (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002), the dorsal
system is most relevant here. Similar but not identical dorsopari-
etal networks appear to be involved in controlling attention to
stimuli in other modalities (Driver et al., 2004), in shifting atten-
tion between vision and audition (Shomstein and Yantis, 2004),
and in attending to stimulus features such as color and motion
(Corbetta and Shulman, 2002).
Also relevant is the question of what neurological process
or state corresponds to attention, in the sense of the differ-
ent amount or type of processing received by an attended-to
stimulus or feature. Attention is associated with the modula-
tion (usually the increase) of neuronal activation, with the result
that attended-to input receives more processing while disattended
input receives less (e.g., Corbetta, 1998; Reynolds, 2004). In
work on the visual system, attention has been found to lead
to greater neural responses for attended stimuli, to a decrease
in suppression by competing stimuli, and to increases in base-
line activity in the attended area (Kastner and Ungerleider,
2001).
The resource hypothesized in the present approach is conceived
of as involving attention, or something closely underlying it, such
as increased gain (Reynolds, 2004), a heightened signal-to-noise
ratio, or increased baseline activation (Kastner and Ungerleider,
2001). It is hypothesized to underlie stages of processing of both
external stimuli and internal representations.
I will now discuss the hypotheses in more detail and will exam-
ine how the atypical allocation of attention-like resources can
contribute to many aspects of autism.
5An intriguing recent approach links cholinergic systems to “attentional effort” and
to performance on attentional tasks (Sarter et al., 2006).
6Another approach to selective attention, the biased competition approach, empha-
sizes bottom-up processes but also allows for frontal and parietal biasing (Desimone
and Duncan, 1995; Pessoa et al., 2003).
HYPOTHESES
RESOURCES IN TYPICAL COGNITION
To illustrate the allocation of resources in Wickens’s (1984, 2002,
2008) multiple resources approach, I will discuss two exam-
ples taken from typical development. (I sometimes distinguish
between streams and stages of processing. Streams of processing
operate largely in parallel; an example is the simultaneous pro-
cessing of different sensory modalities. Stages of processing occur
within a processing stream and are more sequential or cascading;
an example is the movement in linguistic processing from pho-
netic information to meanings, and back again through feedback
connections).
First, consider the example of drinking a cup of tea that one
has been offered. One’s perception of the tea may include sight;
sound (for instance, from the spoon); smell, touch, temperature,
and proprioception. In Wickens’s (2008) view, sensory input from
at least some of these modalities (vision and hearing) is partly sep-
arate but also draws upon a general perceptual pool. In the present
approach, sensory input from these modalities is integrated
and undergoes various stages of cognitive processing, involving
schemas for the teacup, the tea, and the situation in which it has
been offered; there is feedback from later stages to earlier ones.
On the action side (which in Wickens’s (2008) view, draws upon a
different pool of resources from perception/cognition), informa-
tion ﬂows from plans (for instance, to drink the tea) and motor
schemas to motor acts (and back through sensory feedback).
Second, the comprehension and production of language also
involves many stages of processing. People comprehending spo-
ken language in face-to-face interaction must extract phonetic
information, recognize words, and access their meanings; these
processes (which in Wickens’s (2008) scheme draw upon auditory
and verbal resource pools) may not be completely separate (e.g.,
Dahan and Magnuson, 2006). Hearers use semantic and syntactic
information to combine the words into units, which are integrated
into the ongoing discourse representation (e.g., Marslen-Wilson,
1989). In other streamsof processing, hearers process prosody, rec-
ognize embodied aspects of the situation such as gestures or facial
expressions, update representations of the interactional mean-
ing of the utterance, and sometimes plan a reply. Many of these
stages and streams of processing interact with each other. In spo-
ken language comprehension, because new input rapidly arrives
while previous input is processed, most stages of most processing
streams probably operate simultaneously.
THE HYPOTHESES IN AUTISM
Many symptoms of autism could be explained if we assume that
the atypical allocation of resources (and more speciﬁcally, nar-
rowed attention or reduced attentional capacity) affects streams
and stages of the processing of stimuli, particularly meaningful
stimuli. Stimulus overselectivity, in which children with autism
have difﬁculty attending simultaneously to different modalities
or different parts of the same modality (e.g., Lovaas et al., 1979),
can be seen as an example of the effect of narrowed attention
or reduced attentional capacity on parallel streams of perceptual
input; see further discussion below.
For the more sequential stages of processing, I hypothesize that
attentional narrowing or reduced attentional capacity makes it
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hard for people with autism to allocate resources to several stages
of processing at once. In particular, I suggest that within the per-
ceptual/conceptual resource pool, perceptual stages of processing,
or other early stages, compete for resources with later or more
conceptual stages of processing; in the action pool, plans com-
pete with motor schemas. Although in Wickens’s (2008) scheme,
perceptual/conceptual and action resources are separate pools, in
autism, perception may compete with action.
The atypical allocation of resources to different stages of pro-
cessing can be illustrated with Williams’s experiences of what
she calls “meaning-blindness,” in which, particularly when under
stress, she loses the meaning of visual and other stimuli. For exam-
ple, referring to one of the many cups of tea which she was offered
by a friendly couple, Williams describes herself as “sometimes not
visually making meaning from this round white chink-chink thing
with black slop-slop in it” (1994, p. 96); see the discussion above of
perceiving a cup of tea. In the current approach, perceptual stages
may receive an atypically large share of resources and conceptual
stages may receive an atypically small share.
I will now examine how the hypothesized atypical resource
allocation could contribute to a number of areas in autism.
APPLICATION OF THE APPROACH TO ASPECTS OF AUTISM
SENSORY ASPECTS
Children and adults with ASCs have long been noted to have
atypical sensory responses and experiences, including sensory
hypersensitivity, hyposensitivity, and a tendency to seek sen-
sory stimulation (e.g., Ornitz and Ritvo, 1968); atypical sensory
responses are also found in Asperger syndrome (e.g., Dunn et al.,
2002). Though atypical sensory experiences are not speciﬁc to
ASCs, studies based on parental and self-report have found more
sensory symptoms in autism than in control groups (e.g., Rogers
et al., 2003;MinshewandHobson,2008; seeBen-Sasson et al., 2009
for a meta-analysis), and sensory symptoms are now included in
the DSM-V (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
Sensory differences are reported in many ﬁrst-person accounts
by people with ASCs (see, e.g., Bogdashina, 2003; Donnellan et al.,
2006; Robledo et al., 2012). In a book based on such accounts and
on her experiences as the director of a day care center for autistic
children, Bogdashina hypothesizes that the perceptual experience
of people withASCs ﬂuctuates between hypersensitivity, hyposen-
sitivity, and typical perception; this hypothesis is supported by
a study (based on parental report) of children with autism that
found that measures of sensory overreactivity and underreactivity
were correlated in 43% of the sample (Liss et al., 2006).
According to Bogdashina (2003), other atypical phenomena
reported in autism include fragmentary perception (in which a
single modality is focused on or objects are seen in pieces), delayed
perception (in which memorized strips of sensory input may be
analyzed at a later time), synesthesia, and sensory agnosia (difﬁ-
culty in interpreting the meaning of sensory input). Bogdashina
(2003) and Williams (1992, 1994) describe a phenomenon called
“overload,” in which, especially under conditions of stress and
anxiety, sensory input appears to be ampliﬁed and sometimes
snowballs into an overwhelming multisensory experience. This
sometimes leads to what Williams (1992) calls “shutdown,” in
which she feels nothing.
In the present approach, atypical resource allocation may
contribute to sensory abnormalities such as sensory hyper- and
hyposensitivity. Narrowed (but intense) attention may involve the
atypical focusing of attentional resources onorwithin an early sen-
sory processing area, leading to sensory hypersensitivity through
such mechanisms as the ﬁring of more neurons or increased gain
control. This is consistent with ﬁndings that in hearing, stimu-
lus intensity can be encoded through the number and frequency
of neurons ﬁring (Gulick et al., 1989), and that even covert atten-
tion can increase the response to an auditory stimulus at a location
(Spence and Driver, 1994). Conversely, such an intense focusing of
attention-like resources on one modality could decrease resources
devoted to other modalities, resulting in sensory hyposensitiv-
ity or extinction-like processes (Bonneh et al., 2008), and helping
explain stimulus overselectivity andother attentional narrowing in
autism (discussed below). Fluctuations in the amount of resources
devoted to a modality may result in the sense that the input itself
is ﬂuctuating (The opposite possibility, that atypical sensory pro-
cessing in autism may affect the allocation of resources, will be
considered in the neural underpinnings section below).
ATTENTION
Some aspects of attention in autism, including orienting to stimuli,
shifting attention, and the breadth of the attentional focus appear
to be atypical in ASCs, though there have been some mixed results
(Burack et al., 1997).
Shifting attention
Of thework on shifting attention in autism,work on spatial orient-
ing – on shifting attention between spatial locations – and also on
shifting attention between modalities is most relevant7. Studies of
visuospatial orienting often distinguish between exogenous (auto-
matic or reﬂexive) and endogenous (voluntary) orienting, as well
as between orienting which is overt (using movements of sensors
such as the eyes) and covert (using only attention; Burack et al.,
1997). There is conﬂicting evidence about whether young children
with autism are slower (Landry and Bryson, 2004) or as fast as or
faster (Leekam et al., 2000) than controls to disengage overt atten-
tion from a central stimulus and attend to a peripheral stimulus.
With respect to covert shifts of visual attention, individuals with
ASCs (unlike age-matched controls) did not shift covert attention
in response to valid cues at short cue-target intervals, while (like
controls) they did shift attention at longer cue-target intervals
(Wainwright-Sharp and Bryson, 1993). Slowed voluntary covert
orienting in autism has been associated with cerebellar and pari-
etal abnormalities (Townsend et al., 1996) and with diminished
activation in fronto-cerebellar spatial attention networks (Haist
et al., 2005). Some have suggested that problems with symbolically
cued attentional shifts in autism may partly stem from difﬁculty
in interpreting the cues (Burack et al., 1997; Leekam et al., 2000).
Using the ANT, Keehn et al. (2010) found that the orient-
ing network was less efﬁcient in children and adolescents with
autism. Based on their ﬁndings and on a review of literature
on the three attentional networks in autism, Keehn et al. (2013)
7Though joint attention will be discussed later, the extensive work on socially cued
attention in autism is beyond the scope of this paper. Two recent reviews include
discussion of this area (Simmons et al., 2009; Ames and Fletcher-Watson, 2010).
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suggest that impaired disengagement of attention may lead to
atypical perceptual processing and to impairments in arousal reg-
ulation, attentional shifting, and joint attention, contributing to
social-communicative impairments in ASCs.
Turning to shifting attention between modalities, in a study
on task switching in children with autism and two mental age-
matched control groups, Reed and McCarthy (2012) found that
the autistic children performed worse than controls when switch-
ing between two visual tasks; they were especially impaired
when switching between auditory and visual tasks. Noting that
people with autism often have difﬁculty in switching between
multiple cues and in shifting attention once engaged in a
task, Reed and McCarthy (2012) point out that social com-
munication often involves attentional shifts and cross-modal
input. They conclude that their results indicate impaired cross-
modal attention shifting in autism8 and that such impairments
may contribute to social and communicative difﬁculties in
autism.
Suggestions that difﬁculty in disengaging attention (Keehn
et al., 2013) and in cross-modal switching (Reed and McCarthy,
2012) may contribute to social-communicative impairments in
ASCs are reasonable. They are compatible with the hypothesized
atypical resource allocation, which, as suggested below, may con-
tribute to problems with shifting attention. Longitudinal studies,
as well as correlations among these difﬁculties and with measures
of social communication, may help clarify how each ability con-
tributes to the development of social communication in typical
development and autism.
Breadth of attention
The general picture in autism is one of attentional narrowing,
though there has been some mixed evidence.
Early studies of autism found evidence for stimulus overselec-
tivity, a tendency to respond to only part of a complex stimulus,
both within and between modalities (e.g., Lovaas et al., 1979).
Though not exclusive to autism, and associated with intellec-
tual level (Schover and Newsom, 1976), stimulus overselectivity
has been found to be greater in ASCs even when mental age is
controlled for (e.g., Rincover and Ducharme, 1987; Leader et al.,
2009). Stimulus overselectivity is often thought to arise fromatten-
tional narrowing during stimulus presentation, a view supported
by ﬁndings that participants with intellectual disability look less
at underselected parts of the stimulus (Dube et al., 2003). Another
view, that stimulus overselectivity occurs at retrieval and is
increased by an oversensitive“comparator” in autism, is supported
by ﬁndings that when the overselected stimulus was extinguished,
the underselected stimulus reemerged to control behavior; in
autism, this was only found in participants without intellectual
disability (Reed et al., 2009; Reed, 2011). In terms of the present
approach, narrowed or reduced attentional resources, deployed to
salient or highly reinforced aspects of stimuli, could contribute
to stimulus overselectivity during both stimulus presentation and
retrieval.
Electrophysiological and neuroimaging work on the breadth
of attention in autism has had mixed results. In an event-related
8The results may also have reﬂected difﬁculties in shifting set.
potential (ERP) study of covert visual attention in autistic partic-
ipants with cerebellar abnormalities, Townsend and Courchesne
(1994) found that whereas in controls, P1 components (taken
to reﬂect attention-related processing enhancement) decreased
steadily around a central focus, in ﬁve autistic participants with
parietal abnormalities, these components showed a sudden drop-
off around the central focus, whereas in three autistic participants
without parietal abnormalities, the components showed an atyp-
ically broad pattern. In an fMRI study, participants were cued
to covertly shift attention from one visual ﬁeld to the other
while also pointing in the direction of the shift (Belmonte and
Yurgelun-Todd, 2003). In controls, fMRI signal from contralat-
eral early visual processing areas switched back and forth along
with the cued attentional shifts; in autistic participants, the sig-
nal was not modulated by the shifts. The authors concluded
that in autism, activation in early visual processing areas is
not modulated by attention but instead is atypically intense
and broadened, with unattended stimuli possibly being sup-
pressed at a later stage. While early sensory activation in autism
may indeed turn out not to be modulated by attention, the
autistic participants may also have had difﬁculty in shifting atten-
tion back and forth and may have strategically broadened their
attention.
Two recent studiesmay shed light on the breadth of attention in
autism. In one (Mann and Walker, 2003), the authors concluded
that rather than having permanently narrowed attention, autis-
tic people may have difﬁculty in broadening visual attention once
they have narrowed it. In Bonneh et al.’s (2008) case study of a
male adolescent with autism, when stimuli were presented simul-
taneously or in rapid succession, the perception of some stimuli
interfered with the perception of others: auditory stimuli inter-
fered with stimuli in other modalities, and color stimuli interfered
with form stimuli. However, there were no signs of spatial extinc-
tion: perception of stimuli on one side of space did not interfere
with perception of stimuli on the other side. Bonneh et al. suggest
that these effects may reﬂect a non-spatial form of extinction; this
hypothesis will be discussed more below.
First-person accounts describe the experience of narrowed
attention in autism.Writing about her childhood,Williams reports
that when she touched her leg, she typically could feel either her
hand or her leg, but not both at once (Williams, 1994, p. 232). Tito
Mukhopadhyay, a severely affected but literate boy with autism
who was 14 when interviewed, describes difﬁculty in experienc-
ing more than one modality at a time and in switching between
modalities (Blakeslee, 2002). Mukhopadhyay says that when he
was younger, he didn’t feel sensation in his body except when
in the shower or hungry; he implies that he hand-ﬂaps partly to
regain a sense of his body (Blakeslee, 2002).
The recent intense world syndrome approach to autism
addresses narrowed attention among other phenomena (Markram
et al., 2007). In this approach, based on an animal model of autism
in rats prenatally exposed to valproic acid, sensory hypersensitivity
in autism is based on the hyper-reactivity of local neuronal circuits,
and fragmentary perception is based on “hyper-attention,” which
involves“hyper-focusing on fragment(s) of the sensory world with
exaggerated and persistent attention”(Markram et al., 2007, p. 87).
Markram et al. (2007) suggest that difﬁculty in shifting attention
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in autismmay stem fromdifﬁculty in controlling these hyperactive
microcircuits.
The present approach builds on these earlier approaches to
narrowed attention in autism, suggesting that in addition to nar-
rowed attention in the sensory and perceptual world, resources in
people with autism (and especially in those with strong sensory
symptoms) are narrowed to fewer stages of processing, affecting
perception, cognition, and action.
Arousal
Atypical levels of arousal have long been suspected in autism;
hypotheses have included chronic over-arousal (Hutt et al., 1964)
and ﬂuctuating arousal (Ornitz and Ritvo, 1968). Linking hypoth-
esized intermittent over-arousal in autism with hypotheses that
over-arousal leads to the restricted utilization of cues, Kinsbourne
(1987) suggested that over-arousal in autistic children may lead
to stimulus overselectivity, stereotypies, and sensory avoidance.
Recently, there has been renewed interest in the role of arousal in
autism (e.g., Toichi and Kamio, 2003; Anderson and Colombo,
2009). In relation to the present approach, questions include
whether over-arousal could lead to the hypothesized narrowed
attention, and whether such attentional narrowing could extend
to different levels of processing.
Possible role of atypical resource allocation in attention in autism
Narrowed attention and reduced attentional capacity can con-
tribute to difﬁcultieswith rapid voluntary shifts of spatial attention
in autism in at least two ways. First, as others have noted, problems
in interpreting symbolic cues may contribute to such difﬁcul-
ties; atypical resource allocation may affect the comprehension
of symbols, as discussed in the language section below. Sec-
ond, as Bonneh et al. (2008) note, it may be harder to inhibit
an intense attentional focus to start an attentional shift. If, as
Townsend andCourchesne (1994) suggest, an intense central focus
of attention is surrounded by diminished peripheral attention in
autism, itmay also be harder to boost activation in those peripheral
areas. Similarly, a narrowed (and possibly intense) focus on one
modality could contribute to the slowed cross-modal attention
shifts found by Reed and McCarthy (2012). Finally, the intense
activation of early processing areas could lead to diminished
activation of the areas that control and shift attention, includ-
ing the frontal and parietal areas noted by Petersen and Posner
(2012).
Does narrowed or broadened attention come ﬁrst in autism?
In seeming contradiction to the present hypotheses are suggestions
that people with ASCs may sometimes have broadened percep-
tual attention. Autistic people’s vulnerability to sensory overload
as well as tendency towards synesthesia (Bogdashina, 2003) may
reﬂect intense sensory activation that spreads between modali-
ties. Bogdashina (2003) suggests that to avoid sensory overload,
people with ASCs may tend to be aware of only one modal-
ity at a time, though processing without awareness may occur
in other modalities. Belmonte and Yurgelun-Todd (2003) sug-
gest that atypically broad and intense early processing of sensory
input leads to suppression at later stages of processing. In terms
of the present approach, these suggestions raise the questions:
is narrowed attention a primary phenomenon in ASCs, or a
response to intense or spreading sensory activation? At what point
in development, and at what stages of processing, does such
narrowing occur?
PERCEPTUAL/CONCEPTUAL STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
People with autism have unusual perceptual and conceptual
strengths and weaknesses. Children with autism tend to do well on
tasks that involve ignoring context, such as the embedded ﬁgures
test, and tend to do poorly on tasks requiring the interpretation
of stimuli in context, such as the disambiguation of homographs
(Frith and Happé, 1994). This pattern has been described as Weak
Central Coherence (WCC; a diminished drive to integrate infor-
mation into higher-level contextualized representations), more
recently conceptualized as a local processing bias (Happé andFrith,
2006).
Some perceptual abilities are enhanced in autism. People with
autism were better than controls at a task involving discriminating
patterns of small circles (Plaisted et al., 1998a). People with autism
are generally faster than controls at visual search tasks, including
tasks involving targets formed by conjunctions of features, possi-
bly due to a greater ability to discriminate between stimuli (e.g.,
Plaisted et al., 1998b).
In contrast, studies have found that autistic people are less good
than controls at detecting a variety of types of motion, including
global motion; it has been suggested that this is due to prob-
lems with the dorsal visual pathway, which receives predominantly
magnocellular input (e.g., Spencer et al., 2000). However, autis-
tic participants were only impaired at detecting complex motion
and not at detecting simple motion (Bertone et al., 2003); in a
static task, they were better than controls at detecting simple sine
gratings but worse at detecting more complex gratings (Bertone
et al., 2005); Bertone et al. (2005) argue that it is not magnocellular
processing or motion that is more difﬁcult in autism, but rather,
stimulus complexity.
Superior performance on simple perceptual tasks coupled with
difﬁculties on more complex tasks is one of eight principles of
autistic perception suggested byMottron et al. (2006) as part of the
Enhanced Perceptual Functioning (EPF) model9. Another princi-
ple is greater autonomy of perception from top-down inﬂuences
(e.g., Soulières et al., 2007), which may help explain why people
with autism tend to be less susceptible to visual illusions (e.g.,
Mitchell et al., 2010).
Some of the most striking strengths and weaknesses in autism
are seen in autistic savants, who have extraordinary abilities in
areas such as memorization, calculation, drawing, or music, but
who may have intellectual deﬁcits; diminished top-down inﬂu-
ences have also been proposed as being involved (e.g., Snyder and
Mitchell, 1999). Recently, Mottron et al. (2013) have suggested
that savants have veridical mapping (VM), in which perceptual
domains are mapped onto homologous perceptual or abstract
domains, and that VM may also lead to phenomena such as
hyperlexia, absolute pitch, and synesthesia in non-savant autistic
people.
9More recently, Bonnel et al. (2010) found enhanced discrimination of simple
auditory stimuli in autism without decreased discrimination of complex stimuli.
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Role of atypical resource allocation in perceptual strengths and
weaknesses
Atypical resource allocation can help explain this pattern of
strengths and weaknesses. Narrowed attention in ASCs could lead
to a tendency to focus on smaller areas within a modality and
to ignore context, contributing to superior performance on tests
such as the embeddedﬁgures test (Happé andFrith,2006). In addi-
tion, within the perceptual/conceptual resource pool, the atypical
allocation of resources to early processing stages may lead to less
distraction from later stages of processing. The same patterns of
resource allocation could lead to poor performance on tests that
involve evaluating stimuli in context.
The allocation of additional attentional resources to early sen-
sory processing areas can contribute to enhanced sensory and
perceptual discrimination in autism (e.g., Plaisted et al., 1998a;
Bonnel et al., 2010), perhaps by increasing gain control, signal-
to-noise ratio, or baseline activation. Structural differences, such
as altered lateral connectivity (Kéïta et al., 2011) or more numer-
ous narrower minicolumns (Casanova et al., 2002) may also be
involved. Autistic people’s difﬁculties with more complex stimuli
(e.g.,Minshew and Goldstein, 1998; Bertone et al., 2005) may stem
from the effects of narrowed or reduced resources on the number
of cortical areas or stages involved rather than from complexity
per se.
Both the present approach and the EPF model are supported
by an excellent recent meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging
studies of visual processing of faces, objects, and words in autism
(Samson et al., 2012). The meta-analysis, which focused on studies
from which Activation Likelihood Estimation (ALE) maps could
be computed, found that autistic participants generally had greater
activation than controls in posterior regions (temporal, parietal,
and occipital cortices), but less activation than controls in frontal
areas. Samson et al. (2012) suggest that perceptual processing (and
especially visual processing) may play a larger role in cognition in
autism than in controls.
EXECUTIVE FUNCTION AND MOVEMENT
Executive function
Executive functions, including planning, shifting mental set, gen-
erating alternative actions, and inhibition (Hill, 2004), are thought
to be subserved by the frontal lobes. Problems with executive func-
tion have been proposed as a primary deﬁcit in autism and as an
alternative explanation for difﬁculties with theory of mind tasks
(Ozonoff et al., 1991). While some studies of people with autism
have found problems with aspects of executive function, such as
shifting set (Ozonoff et al., 1991) and inhibiting responses (Hughes
and Russell, 1993) other studies have found less evidence of execu-
tive problems or have linked them with developmental level rather
than with autism per se (e.g., Grifﬁth et al., 1999).
The hypothesized atypical resource allocation is especially com-
patible with Ozonoff’s (1995) account of executive function in
autism. Drawing upon work on the role of the prefrontal cortex
in holding representations on-line as a guide to action, Ozonoff
(1995) suggests that what is common to the executive function
tasks is an ability to “disengage from the immediate environment
or external context and guide behavior instead by mental models
or internal representations” (p. 201). Ozonoff (1995) hypothesizes
that an inability to hold mental representations on-line may
explain autistic people’s difﬁculties with theory of mind tasks,
emotionperception, imitation, spatial reasoning, andpretendplay.
Atypical resource allocation in autism can help explain difﬁ-
culties in holding a mental representation online as a guide to
action. It is often assumed that action has a hierarchical structure,
involving a continuously updated overall plan as well as smaller
goals and motor actions, and that motor acts involve perceptual
and proprioceptive feedback. Given these assumptions, narrowed
attention or reduced attentional capacity may make it difﬁcult to
simultaneously allocate resources to plans and action schemas and
to monitor perceptual and proprioceptive feedback.
Movement
Movement differences and disturbances have long been noted in
ASCs (e.g., Kanner, 1943; Damasio and Maurer, 1978). Movement
differences in autism include apraxia, atypical postures, repeti-
tive behaviors such as hand-ﬂapping, and difﬁculty in starting
or stopping movements (Donnellan et al., 2006). Donnellan et al.
(2006) suggest that while such movement differences have often
been regarded as volitional “autistic behaviors,” they can be more
fruitfully seen as reﬂecting neurological differences, just as tics
in Tourette Syndrome are seen as reﬂecting neurological differ-
ences. Donnellan et al.’s (2013) approach to autism centers on
such sensory and movement differences, and broadens movement
to include aspects of emotion and thought.
Whyatt and Craig (2013) found that people with autism have
special difﬁculties with prospective movements such as catching
a ball, in which the movement must connect with an external
moving object; they suggest that this is due to problems with
perception-action coupling and the spatiotemporal control of
movement.
Torres and colleagues hypothesize that differences in stochas-
tic signatures of spontaneous vs. goal directed movement form a
source of kinesthetic/proprioceptive afferent feedback that helps
children develop intentional movements (Brincker and Torres,
2013; Torres, 2013; Torres et al., 2013). In a case study of an autis-
tic adolescent and controls learning a martial arts sequence, Torres
(2013) found that goal-directed and spontaneousmovementswere
stochastically distinguishable in the controls but not in the autis-
tic participant, whose movements were also very similar to one
another. In a later study of movement in ASD and TD participants
over a wide range of ages, Torres et al. (2013) found that the ASD
participants’ movements were more similar to those of young TD
children, with a narrower bandwidth of speeds but also less pre-
dictable variability across trials. Torres et al. (2013) suggest that
older ASD participants may compensate for their lack of kines-
thetic learning by relying on other means such as visual feedback.
Torres et al. (2013) suggest that noisy, unreliable movement in
autism contributes to difﬁculties interpreting others’ movements
and may contribute to a preference for sameness and to social
impairments.
Atypical resource allocation can contribute tomovement differ-
ences in autism in a variety of ways. Narrowed attention could lead
to a lack of proprioceptive and tactile perception of one’s ownbody
parts, probably making it harder to initiate movements. Prospec-
tive motions such as those studied by Whyatt and Craig (2013)
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should be even harder for people with narrowed attention because
real-time awareness of one’s own body movements must be inte-
grated with information about the object’s ongoing trajectory. In
the Torres (2013) and Torres et al. (2013) studies, decreased real-
time proprioceptive feedback could lead movements to be more
ballistic and similar in speed as well as to a lack of kinesthetic
learning and less predictable variability across movements.
While the present approach may contribute to an explanation
of some of these differences, it cannot fully explain this rich area.
For instance, whereas a lack of proprioceptive feedback might
contribute to difﬁculty in initiating movements, another cause
might involve reduced dopamine, as found in Parkinson’s disease.
LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION
As reﬂected in the DSM-IV criteria, language is usually delayed
and sometimes absent in autism, and non-verbal communication
is also affected. Syntactic andphonological development in autism,
though reﬂecting general language delay, are usually less affected
than some other aspects of language, though some children with
autism have severe phonological problems (Tager-Flusberg et al.,
2005). While many researchers attribute language and communi-
cation impairments in autism to social deﬁcits, autistic children’s
early oral and manual-motor skills have been found to strongly
correlate with their later speech ﬂuency, implying that for at least
some autistic people whose language is absent or delayed, motor
issues may be involved (Gernsbacher et al., 2008). As discussed in
the previous section, atypical resource allocation can contribute
to these motor difﬁculties.
The present approach is especially relevant to three aspects of
language and communication that tend to be strongly affected in
ASCs: prosody, pragmatics, and semantics.
Prosody
Prosody is often impaired in both autism (Baltaxe et al., 1984;
Tager-Flusberg et al., 2005) and Asperger’s syndrome (Klin and
Volkmar, 1997). In terms of the present approach, problems with
the production of prosody in autism may result from difﬁculty in
hearing others’ meaning and prosody at the same time, making
it harder to learn prosodic norms (Schreibman et al., 1986); from
autistic people’s difﬁculty in speaking and listening to themselves
at the same time, making it hard for them to monitor their own
prosody (Bonneh et al., 2008); and possibly from motor issues.
Pragmatics
Pragmatic impairments in autism range from early difﬁculties
with eye contact and joint attention (Mundy et al., 1993) to later
difﬁculties with politeness, social register, and orienting to inter-
locutors’ interests and knowledge (Tager-Flusberg et al., 2005);
despite relatively spared language abilities, people with Asperger’s
tend to have pragmatic difﬁculties (Klin andVolkmar, 1997). Prag-
matic impairments in autism and Asperger syndrome are usually
attributed to social impairments in these conditions, but as dis-
cussed below, semantic factors and resource allocation may also
play a role.
Semantics
There is mixed evidence about word use, reading, and semantic
processing in autism. While autistic children without intellectual
disability tend to do well on vocabulary, they may have dif-
ﬁculty with mental state terms, emotion words, and deictics
(Tager-Flusberg et al., 2005). In reading, although decoding (the
ability to read words aloud) is (on average) on par with develop-
mental level, reading comprehension is generally impaired (e.g.,
Nation et al., 2006). Some children with autism have hyperlexia,
in which decoding outstrips comprehension (Tager-Flusberg et al.,
2005).
While some aspects of semantic processing and categorization
are intact in autism, others are different or impaired. Unlike con-
trols, autistic children do not use semantic categories to cluster
items during recall (e.g.,Hermelin andO’Connor, 1970). Children
with autism perform similarly to controls on some categorization
tasks (e.g., Ungerer and Sigman, 1987); however, unlike the cat-
egories of typically developing children, their categories appear
to not be based on prototypes (e.g., Dunn et al., 1996). Autistic
people (without intellectual disability) showed semantic priming
effects in word completion tasks (Toichi and Kamio, 2001) but not
on a lexical decision task (Kamio et al., 2007).
Evidence from electrophysiological and neuroimaging studies
supports the view that semantic processing is affected in autism. In
an ERP study, Dunn et al. (1999) found that children with autism,
unlike controls, did not show a N400 response (usually seen
in response to semantic incongruity) to unexpected non-target
words. In contrast, in a study using magnetoencephalography
(MEG),Braeutigam et al. (2008) found that autistic adults without
intellectual disability had different MEG patterns for congruent
and incongruent sentence endings, though patterns in both condi-
tions were different from those of controls. Neuroimaging studies
have found atypical patterns of activation during semantic and
other linguistic processing in autism (e.g., Müller et al., 1999; Just
et al., 2004; Gaffrey et al., 2007).
Role of resource allocation in semantic and pragmatic processing
in autism
In terms of the present approach, semantic and pragmatic pro-
cessing both involve many stages of processing. When resources
are limited, earlier stages compete for resources with later, more
meaning-related stages. For autistic people with the most reduced
or narrowed resources, competition for resources between per-
ceptions and higher levels of processing may lead to difﬁculty
simultaneously allocating resources to the sound and meaning
of language; they may have trouble accessing even the literal
meanings of words and sentences.
The temporal nature of spoken language, in which the process-
ing of previous words must be completed while new words rapidly
come in, may complicate allocating attention to several stages of
processing in autism. Similar difﬁculties may occur in reading.
The intact decoding and impaired comprehension characteristic
of hyperlexia may reﬂect a tendency for early stages of processing
to use up the available resources.
Because autistic people with increasingly broad attentional
bandwidths can attend to progressively more levels of language,
the present approach can also help explain the difﬁculties that
people with autism and without intellectual disability are said to
have with understanding ﬁgurative language, irony, and indirect
speech acts. Happé suggests that these difﬁculties may arise from
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difﬁculties in understanding speakers’ communicative intentions;
she found that autistic children’s performance on tests of non-
literal language was roughly correlated with their performance on
ﬁrst and second-order theory of mind tasks (Happé, 1993, 1995).
Gernsbacher and Pripas-Kapit (2012) have criticized these and
similar studies, arguing that difﬁculty in comprehending ﬁgura-
tive and contextualized language – and also in doing many theory
of mind tasks – may stem from general language comprehension
difﬁculties.
In the present approach, narrowed or reduced resources can
lead people with autism to have difﬁculty in simultaneously
attending to literalmeanings, ﬁgurativemeanings, and representa-
tions of context. Autistic people’s difﬁculties with pragmatics may
likewise arise from difﬁculties with simultaneously attending to
the literal meanings of utterances, to their social meanings, and to
the surrounding social context. In people withAsperger’s disorder,
strong interests and linguistic abilities coupled with difﬁculty in
simultaneously talking and tracking interlocutors’ reactions may
contribute to a tendency to engage in monologues.
The present approach can also help explain neuroimaging
results for semantic processing in autism. In this view, due to
narrowed attention or reduced attentional capacity, earlier stages
of semantic processing in autism receive atypicallymore resources,
while later stages of processing receive fewer resources; the acti-
vation of early stages competes with that of later stages. This
is supported by recent neuroimaging studies of semantic and
other linguistic processing in autism, which have found increased
activation relative to controls in regions associated with earlier
processing stages along with decreased activation in regions asso-
ciated with later stages. For example, Gaffrey et al. (2007) found
that during a semantic decision task, men with ASCs and with-
out intellectual disability had increased activation in extrastriate
visual cortex and decreased activation in the left inferior frontal
gyrus (LIFG) comparedwith controls.Whereas this was attributed
to the use of visual imagery by autistic participants, it could also
reﬂect increased resource allocation to the visual stimuli along
with concomitant decreases in resource allocation to later stages of
processing.
This is not the only approach to link attentional resources and
language processing in autism. Oller and Rascon (1999) propose
a detailed semiotic hierarchy and suggest that autistic people at
progressively higher levels of functioning can use increasing lev-
els of semiotic resources. Bara et al. (2001) link processing of
pragmatics and ﬁgurative language with attentional bandwidth;
because of the study’s facilitated communication manipulation,
some may interpret the results with caution. The monotropism
approach looks at the narrowing of attention in autism in terms of
both perceptual narrowing and the narrowed but strong inter-
ests of people with autism (Murray et al., 2005). Connecting
monotropism with the present approach, people with autism may
be able to allocate more resources to processing streams asso-
ciated with their interests, allowing deeper processing of those
topics.
SOCIAL COGNITION AND INTERACTION
The hypothesized typical resource allocation could contribute to
difﬁculties with social cognition and interaction in several ways.
Theory of mind
Problems with theory of mind, and poor performance on false
belief tests, have often been noted in autism (e.g., Baron-Cohen
et al., 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1995); there has been much debate
about these ﬁndings and their implications (e.g., Yirmiya et al.,
1998). Atypical resource allocation can indirectly contribute to
difﬁculties with theory of mind by affecting autistic people’s
comprehension of language and social situations.
There is evidence that impoverished linguistic experience can
affect performance on theory of mind tests: a large percentage
of prelingually deaf children raised by parents who are not ﬂu-
ent in sign language (and who thus tend to converse in sign with
their children about concrete topics) do poorly on theory of mind
tests (e.g., Peterson and Siegal, 1998). If, as discussed above, atyp-
ical resource allocation affects autistic children’s comprehension
of language and social situations, that would decrease their expe-
rience with theory of mind concepts and contribute to difﬁculty
with such concepts and with false belief tests.
Joint attention
In typical development, joint attention develops before theory of
mind. In autism, certain joint attention behaviors are affected
early in development (Mundy et al., 1993); impairments in joint
attention and in intersubjectivity more generally (Hobson, 1993)
have been suggested as primary deﬁcits in autism. Because young
children with autism initiated fewer non-verbal bids than controls
to share attention to objects, but initiated a similar number as con-
trols of non-verbal requests for objects, Mundy et al. (1993) argue
that autistic children’s difﬁculties with joint attention are social
rather than cognitive. More recently, Mundy and Neal (2001) have
hypothesized that deﬁcits in joint attention and social orienting
in autism lead to impoverished social input, creating a secondary
neural disturbance that may help push the child further off the
path of typical development. Mundy et al. (2010) regard joint
attention as a process that develops with increasing coordination
of information about an object, another’s attention to that object,
and one’s own experience of the situation (including interoception
and proprioception).
In the present approach, resource limitations could affect the
development of joint attention by making it harder to simul-
taneously attend to another person, an object, and processes
within the self such as interoception and proprioception. More
generally, by interfering with the awareness of bodily feelings
(somatic markers), which contribute to emotion, social cognition,
and decision-making (Damasio, 1994), attentional narrowing or
reduced attentional capacity in autism can contribute to problems
with social cognition and executive function. Finally, autistic peo-
ple’s atypical perceptual experiences (which may partly stem from
atypical resource allocation) can affect their ability to experience
intersubjectivity with neurotypical people.
The mirror neuron system
The mirror neuron system, whose neurons are active when a per-
son or monkey executes an action and when they observe that
action, has been proposed as being involved in autism (Williams
et al., 2004; Dapretto et al., 2006). In Dapretto et al.’s (2006) fMRI
study,when childrenwith autismobserved and imitated emotional
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facial expressions, they had less activity than controls in a num-
ber of brain areas, including the pars opercularis, a part of the
LIFG previously associated with mirror neuron activity; they had
similar activation to controls in facial processing areas such as
the fusiform gyrus and greater activation than controls in right
visual and left anterior parietal areas. In the present approach, the
decreased activation seen in the LIFG, at the apex of the mirror
neuron system, as well as in other areas, may result from atypical
resource allocation leading to decreased activation of later stages
of processing rather than from a speciﬁc problem with mirror
neurons; it may even be caused by the increased activation of the
earlier areas. Decreased connectivity could also be involved. This
would not change possible effects of decreased activation of the
mirror neuron system.
OTHER POSSIBILITIES AND ALTERNATIVES
Before discussing possible neural bases for the hypothesized dif-
ferences, some alternatives should be mentioned. The current
hypotheses assume that autistic people have the relevant motor
or comprehension schemas but cannot access or activate them
due to resource problems. But it could be that the autistic people
don’t have the schemas, perhaps due to a difﬁculty in form-
ing prototypes (Klinger and Dawson, 1995, 2001), whether due
to atypical resource allocation or from other causes. It’s also
possible that people with autism have a speciﬁc difﬁculty with
social schemas; this could arise from a number of causes, such
as the greater complexity of such schemas, a cascade of effects
caused by impaired social orienting (Mundy and Neal, 2001), or
an innate inability to form social schemas. Tests of the current
hypotheses must take these possibilities into account. While a dif-
ﬁculty in forming schemas might explain some of the symptom
areas discussed above, it’s hard to see how it could explain other
areas such as sensory hypo- and hypersensitivity, enhanced per-
ceptual discrimination, fragmentary perception, and ﬂuctuating
senses.
If, as suggested here, differences in autism narrow or reduce
the resources deployed to different stages of processing, this could
occur in two ways. First, the earliest perceptual levels could claim
the resources ﬁrst, leaving fewer resources for later stages. Sec-
ond, either the earlier, more perceptual levels or the higher, more
abstract levels could receive attentional resources – just not both
at the same time.
POSSIBLE NEURAL UNDERPINNINGS
There are a number of possible neural bases of the hypothesized
atypical resource allocation in autism. While much neurological
research on autism (for a review, see Minshew et al., 2005) has
focused on speciﬁc brain areas, there is an increasing emphasis on
factors affecting the whole brain and its systems (e.g., Minshew
and Williams, 2007; Müller, 2007).
There has been little work explicitly on the neural bases
of resource allocation; some is mentioned below. Because the
hypothesized resource is similar to or closely underlies selective
attention, the following survey will begin with the dorsoparietal
orienting network (e.g., Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Corbetta
et al., 2008) and will move on to other neurological areas and
aspects that may affect resource allocation in autism.
THE NETWORK OF AREAS INVOLVED IN ATTENTIONAL ORIENTING MAY
ACT DIFFERENTLY
Frontal areas
Superior frontal areas, including the FEF, have been implicated
in the attention orienting network (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002;
Petersen and Posner, 2012). While Bauman and Kemper’s (1994)
postmortem study did not ﬁnd frontal abnormalities in autism,
more recent studies have found atypically narrow minicolumns
(Buxhoeveden et al., 2006) and brain overgrowth in the frontal
lobes of people with autism (e.g., Herbert et al., 2004). A recent
postmortem study found that the brains six of seven autistic
children had greater numbers of prefrontal neurons than con-
trols, especially in dorsal prefrontal cortex, beyond what might
be expected given the increased brain weights also found in the
autistic children (Courchesne et al., 2011).
Parietal lobes
As noted above, dorsal parietal areas have also been found to be
involved in the top-down deployment of attention (Corbetta and
Shulman, 2002; Petersen and Posner, 2012) and are a promising
area in autism. OneMRI study found that 43%of a sample of autis-
tic people had parietal abnormalities (Courchesne et al., 1993); as
discussed above, some autistic people with parietal abnormalities
as well as cerebellar abnormalities appear to have narrowed visual
attention (Townsend and Courchesne, 1994).
In addition, damage to parietal cortex, especially to right
parietal cortex, can lead to extinction, a form of which has
been suggested as a cause for autistic people’s atypical sensory
and attentional experiences (Bonneh et al., 2008). In their case
study, Bonneh et al. hypothesize that many of their participant’s
extinction-like symptoms and unusual sensory experiences come
from a winner-take-all mode of processing in which a salient stim-
ulus or representation extinguishes other stimuli, in what could be
seen as an extreme version of the processes described in the biased
competition approach (Desimone and Duncan, 1995). They sug-
gest that this pattern aswell as slowed attentional shiftingmay stem
from abnormalities in the parietal cortex or superior temporal
sulcus.
Could these extinction-like phenomena stem from narrowed
attention or reduced attentional capacity? Bonneh et al. (2008)
argue that “mono-channel perception” is unlikely to come from
a lack of attentional resources because it was found even when
perceptual load and attentional demands appeared to be low; they
acknowledge that the perceptual load in autismmay be higher than
it seems. Another question is whether winner-take-all processing
or extinction could occur in relation to competition between dif-
ferent stages of processing of a single stimulus. This would suggest
another possible mechanism for the phenomena highlighted in
the present approach.
The cerebellum
While some suggest that the cerebellum ﬁne-tunes attentional
shifts in the same way that it ﬁne-tunes motor movements and
describe morphological changes in the cerebellum in autism
(Courchesne, 1989; Courchesne et al., 1994), others have said that
the morphological results were correlated with IQ and have not
been replicated as speciﬁc to autism (Minshew et al., 2005). In
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addition, the role of the cerebellum in attention has been disputed
(e.g., Haarmeier and Thier, 2007); further study is needed.
OTHER NEURAL AREAS, SYSTEMS, AND PHENOMENA THAT MAY
AFFECT RESOURCE ALLOCATION
The nucleus reticularis of the thalamus
Though not frequently discussed in relation to attention, the
nucleus reticularis of the thalamus (NRT) could play a role in
atypical resource allocation in autism. Almost all sensory input
passes through the thalamus on its way to the cortex; information
may go back through the thalamus several times after processing
in various cortical areas. Scheibel (1997) has suggested that the
NRT, a thin layer of (inhibitory) GABAergic cells around several
sides of the thalamus, is involved in the top-down control of pain
and the gating of sensory input to the cortex. NRT cells are part of
a complex feedback system involving prefrontal cortex, thalamic
nuclei, and the midbrain tegmentum.
There are several ways that the NRT might be involved in
sensory and attentional phenomena in autism. For sensory infor-
mation coming back from the cortex to the thalamus, the presence
of numerous narrow cortical minicolumns (Casanova et al., 2002)
could lead to excessive input to areas of theNRT, leading to atypical
inhibition of surrounding areas and possibly to narrowed atten-
tion. Conversely, deﬁcits in GABAergic neurons hypothesized in
autism (Rubenstein and Merzenich, 2003), or decreased input
from the midbrain tegmentum, might mean less NRT activity,
ﬂooding the cortex with input; this could correspond to the sen-
sory overload sometimes reported in autism. Atypical prefrontal
input to the NRT could also affect sensory processing in autism.
Limbic system
Due to their role in emotion and cognition, limbic areas have
long been suspected to be involved in autism. Bauman and Kem-
per (1994) found abnormalities in most limbic areas in autism,
including impoverished dendritic arbors in hippocampal pyrami-
dal cells. Waterhouse et al. (1996) suggest that these hippocampal
abnormalities may result in canalesthesia, in which cross-modal
processing of events and memories is fragmented; they suggest
that the hippocampus may indirectly affect attention in autistic
people through its feedback to cortical areas.
Laterality
Hemispheric specialization and interhemispheric communica-
tion, bothof which appear tobe affected inASCs, are closely related
to issues of resource allocation. Hemispheric specialization for a
variety of functions is thought to increase processing efﬁciency,
minimizing resource use. According to Friedman and Polson
(1981), evidence generally supports the view of hemispheres as
independent pools of resources. In addition, the optimal division
of labor between the hemispheres varies depending on task con-
ditions (Zaidel et al., 1988) and has been shown to change after
sleep deprivation, when efﬁciency and resources are presumably
reduced (Coto, 2009). In terms of the present approach, altered
laterality is most relevant to the hypothesis of reduced attentional
capacity.
Behavioral studies of hemispheric specialization in autism have
had mixed results (e.g., Prior and Bradshaw, 1979; Dawson et al.,
1986; Rumsey and Hamburger, 1988). Rinehart et al. (2002) argue
that the autistic proﬁle has elements of both left hemisphere dys-
function (impaired language and sequential processing; preserved
visual-spatial and musical abilities) and right-hemisphere dys-
function (impaired pragmatics and prosody; relatively preserved
syntax and phonology). People with autism (without intellectual
disability), especially those with early language problems, have
less clearly established handedness than controls (Escalante-Mead
et al., 2003).
Neurological evidence is likewise mixed, including evidence
about whether the corpus callosum is smaller in autism (Minshew
et al., 2005); there is some evidence of reduced inter-hemispheric
information transfer (Nydén et al., 2004). Structural MRI has
found atypical brain asymmetry in autistic boys with language
impairment, while those without language impairment were sim-
ilar to controls (De Fossé et al., 2004). Different patterns of hemi-
spheric activation found in ASCs and controls during language
processing depend on the task and do not fall into a simple hemi-
spheric pattern (e.g., Müller et al., 1999; Just et al., 2004; Harris
et al., 2006; Kleinhans et al., 2008). The general picture regarding
laterality for language inASCs is one of decreasedhemispheric spe-
cialization and increased right-hemisphere involvement relative to
controls, especially for autistic people with language impairments.
Atypical laterality inASCs couldbe involved in atypical resource
allocation in several ways. Decreased hemispheric specializa-
tion could lead processing to be less efﬁcient, “using up” more
resources. Conversely, inefﬁcient processing might lead people
with autism to use both hemispheres for tasks only requiring
one hemisphere in neurotypical people. Even if hemispheric
specialization for certain functions is fairly typical in ASCs,
reduced resources or decreased interhemispheric connectivity
might largely conﬁne the receptive processing of a stimulus to one
hemisphere, to the detriment of processes associatedwith the other
hemisphere or requiring hemispheric cooperation. These possibil-
ities can be tested using experiments with unilateral and bilateral
visual hemiﬁeld presentations aswell aswithERPs andneuroimag-
ing (e.g., Zaidel et al., 1988; Narr et al., 2003; Coto, 2009).
INTENSE SENSORY PROCESSING MAY AFFECT OTHER STAGES OF
PROCESSING
The atypical sensory experiences and enhanced perceptual dis-
crimination discussed earlier imply that sensory processing is
sometimes more intense and detailed in autism than in typical
development. As noted in Samson et al.’s (2012) ALE study, some
neuroimaging studies of higher-level processing in autism have
found more activation in early perceptual areas in ASC partici-
pants than in controls (e.g., Just et al., 2004; Koshino et al., 2005).
Intense sensory processing in autism could be related to several
other neural phenomena: people with autism have been found to
have narrower, more numerous cortical mini-columns (Casanova
et al., 2002), and have been hypothesized to have a greater ratio of
neural excitation to inhibition (Rubenstein and Merzenich, 2003),
increased local connectivity (e.g., Belmonte and Yurgelun-Todd,
2003), and hyperactive local circuits (Markram et al., 2007).
Increased processing in a primary sensory area could lead to
decreased processing in other sensory areas and at higher levels due
to resource-allocating mechanisms. Though little is known about
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such mechanisms, several lines of research imply that they exist.
First, behavioral experiments by Lavie (1995) indicate that under
conditions of high perceptual load, selective attention occurs ear-
lier in the system and more irrelevant items are screened out;
thus, intense sensory processing in autism could lead to narrowed
attention10.
Second, as mentioned earlier, fMRI experiments have found
that attention to one feature or modality can reduce the activation
of areas processing other features or modalities (e.g., Corbetta
et al., 1990; Shomstein and Yantis, 2004). Third, in a phenomenon
known as“negative BOLD,”the activation of one area of visual cor-
tex can lead to decreased activation of other areas; this decreased
activation appears to result from a neural control mechanism
rather than from the mechanical “stealing” of blood ﬂow by the
activated area (Smith et al., 2004). The hemodynamic response
itself, in which neural activation leads to increased blood ﬂow
to a brain area, might be different in autism. Compared with
mental-age-matched controls, children with both intellectual dis-
ability and autism have been found to have reduced perfusion in a
number of brain areas (e.g., Ohnishi et al., 2000; Zilbovicius et al.,
2000); however, the participants were sedated and the ﬁndings not
consistent. In any event, it is possible that atypically intense sensory
activation coupled with typical mechanisms of resource allocation
could lead to decreased activation of other sensory modalities and
of later stages of processing.
ATYPICAL BRAIN CONNECTIVITY MAY BE INVOLVED
An increasing number of studies have suggested that atypical brain
connectivity is involved in autism. Based on studies of functional
connectivity, a number of researchers have suggested that there
is underconnectivity in autism – decreased long-range connec-
tivity between brain areas. For example, in their fMRI study of
sentence processing, Just et al. (2004) found that compared with
controls, autistic participants had decreased functional connectiv-
ity between a variety of pairs of brain areas, most including frontal
areas. As noted by Müller (2007), however, not all functional
connectivity studies of autism have found evidence for general
underconnectivity.
Citing work on structural as well as functional connectiv-
ity, other studies have suggested that in addition to long-range
underconnectivity, there is local overconnectivity in autism (Bel-
monte and Yurgelun-Todd, 2003; Courchesne and Pierce, 2005).
Belmonte and Yurgelun-Todd suggest that such increased local
connectivity in autism is associated with intense perceptual activa-
tion, impaired selective attention, and a poor signal-to-noise ratio,
leading to inefﬁcient compensation at higher levels of process-
ing. Courchesne and Pierce (2005) argue that ﬁndings in autism
of increased white matter, inﬂammation, and atypical minicol-
umn patterns in frontal areas imply that excessive connectivity
within the frontal lobes may be coupled with reduced connec-
tivity to more posterior regions. Similarly, Geschwind and Levitt
(2007) suggest that atypical cell growth early in autism may lead
evolutionarily recent higher association areas to be disconnected
10This last suggestion is not supported by Remington et al. (2009), who found
that adults with autism had greater perceptual capacity than controls. (Controls,
however, had less perceptual capacity than neurotypical people in other studies).
from evolutionarily older sensory areas. Finally, Markram et al.
(2007) suggest that increased connectivity, reactivity, and plastic-
ity of neocortical microcircuits in autism could lead to intense
perception, attention, and memory as well as decreased frontal
coordination.
In termsof the present approach, increased local structural con-
nectivity could lead to intense sensory processing, which could
affect later stages of processing as discussed above. Decreased
long-distance structural connectivity could cause sensory sig-
nals to become atypically attenuated as they move to later
stages of processing; it could also impair feedback to earlier
areas, as suggested by Frith (2003). Nevertheless, the present
approach differs from purely connectivity-based approaches.
While many connectivity approaches emphasize structural as well
as functional connectivity, the attentional differences hypoth-
esized in the present approach (though they may be partly
caused by atypical structural connectivity) rely more on the
ﬂuid deployment of attentional resources. This may better
explain why individuals with autism have different experi-
ences and abilities at different times. The present approach
accounts for the processing of meaningful stimuli in terms of
the simultaneous activation of different stages of processing,
while Just et al.’s (2004) approach emphasizes the coordination
of higher-level brain areas; the two accounts are not mutually
exclusive.
TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
In this section, I will sketch several experimental approaches that
can help test and reﬁne the hypotheses. In addition to seeing
whether the hypotheses hold for autistic people generally, it will
be useful to test subgroups of autistic people in which atypical
resource allocation is likely to be a greater factor, such as those
with strong sensory symptoms (hyposensitivity and/or hypersen-
sitivity), and to examine correlations between each ﬁnding and
measures of sensory symptoms.
USE RESOURCE THEORETICAL TECHNIQUES TO EXAMINE WHETHER
RESOURCES IN AUTISM MARE NARROWED OR REDUCED
A preliminary question is whether the structure of resources in
autism is similar to the structure found in typical development, as
exempliﬁed in Wickens’s 3-D + 1 model (Wickens, 2002, 2008).
The structure of resources in autism can be tested using tech-
niques similar to those used in typical development (e.g., Navon
and Gopher, 1979; Wickens, 1980, 1984, 2002, 2008). Because
tasks can be resource-limited (limited by the amount of resources)
up to the application of a certain amount of resources and data-
limited (limited by the quality of the data) thereafter (Norman and
Bobrow, 1975), tasks are best tested at different levels of resources.
This is generally done using dual-task paradigms (e.g., Navon and
Gopher, 1979; Wickens, 1980, 1984) in which the priority or the
difﬁculty (or both) of amanipulated task is varied and its effects on
performance on a measured task are examined. Performance on
each task done singly is also examined, providing a limiting case in
which no resources are taken by the other task. By varying the type
of task (e.g., auditory vs. visual; input- or output-focused) and see-
ing which kinds of tasks interfere with each other, the structure of
resource pools can be inferred.
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Dual-task experiments face a number of potential issues,
including the possibility that results may reﬂect interference
between tasks (Navon, 1984) or the cost of switching back
and forth between the tasks rather than the simultaneous use
of resources. These challenges are exacerbated when studying
resource allocation in affected populations; analogous issues arise
when dual-task experiments are used to examine resources across
development (Guttentag, 1989). Some concerns are that members
of the two groups may implement priority instructions differ-
ently (e.g., may not be able to allocate 30% of their attention to
one task and 70% to another) and may have different abilities
(e.g., autistic participants may be better than neurotypical con-
trols at some perceptual tasks and worse at some verbal ones).
To allocate different amounts of resources to the tasks, partici-
pants have to be able to understand the instructions, and should
probably be adolescents or adults (Irwin-Chase and Burns, 2000,
found that in a dual-task paradigm, children before the ﬁfth
grade could not make more subtle attention allocations than
50–50).
One of the few dual-task studies of autism illustrates both the
promise and possible problems of these paradigms. In a study
arising out of work on the executive functions of working mem-
ory, Garcia-Villamisar and Della Sala (2002) found that when
adults with autism did a digit recall task along with a tracking
task (in which they crossed out boxes arranged in paths on pieces
of paper), their performance on both tasks declined relative to
their performance on either task alone, while controls were not so
affected. The ﬁndings support the present hypotheses of reduced
resources. Note that the two tasks use fairly separate resource
pools in Wickens’s 3-D+1 scheme: the digit recall task involves
the auditory modality, perceptual/cognitive resources (memory),
and vocal responses; the tracking task involves the visual modality
and manual responses.
However, the results for the autistic participantsmay also reﬂect
problems with executive function, such as difﬁculties in orga-
nizing themselves to do both tasks or in shifting between tasks;
autistic participants have difﬁculty in shifting between tasks and
modalities (e.g., Reed and McCarthy, 2012). In all participants, a
measure of combined performance was negatively correlated with
a questionnaire measuring executive function (r = −0.323), sug-
gesting that executive function may indeed play a role. A weaker
correlation between combined performance on the tasks and the
Wisconsin Card Sort Test (r = −0.16) suggests that perseveration
or shifting set was not the main cause of the dual-task deﬁcits.
Varying the priority or difﬁculty of one task would also help
determine whether the reduced performance on both tasks in
autism reﬂects one task taking resources from the other or the
“concurrence cost” of doing any two tasks at once.
Despite the above concerns, dual-task experiments can help
compare the structure and allocation of resources in autism and
in typical development. Such experiments can systematically focus
on dimensions in Wickens’s (2002, 2008) 3-D + 1 schema that are
of particular interest in the present approach, such as whether in
the general perceptual pool, differentmodalities such as vision and
hearing appear to be in separate pools in autism as they are in typ-
ical development, or likewise, whether the perception/cognition
pool is separate from the response pool.
USE OTHER BEHAVIORAL PARADIGMS TO EXAMINE RESOURCE
ALLOCATION IN AUTISM
Reducing resource demands in tasks with multiple levels of
processing
If narrowed attention or reduced attentional capacity leads to
difﬁculty in autism in simultaneously allocating resources to dif-
ferent stages of processing, then for tasks with multiple stages of
processing, manipulations that free up resources should improve
processing at later stages. For instance, making earlier stages of
linguistic processing less attention-grabbing (for example, by pre-
senting spoken stimuli more quietly or in a monotone) might
improve semantic and pragmatic processing in people with autism
more than in controls. One would have to take into account par-
ticipants’ sensory discrimination abilities, their physiological and
emotional responses to stimuli, and the amount of information
contained in the stimuli.
Trade-offs between levels of processing
The hypotheses of narrowed or reduced attention imply that for
each (sufﬁciently difﬁcult) stimulus, people with autism will have
a tradeoff between different stages of processing, while controls
will not. One can test this prediction by following stimuli with
probes that measure processing at different stages, and examin-
ing correlations between measures of performance associated with
the different stages. While neurotypical participants would tend to
have positive correlations betweenmeasures of performance at dif-
ferent stages (because they would either attend to each stimulus or
not), peoplewith autismmight havenegative correlations (because
their attention to one stage of processingwould competewith their
attention to other stages). For example, one could present a series
of words known to all participants, and after each word present
probes examining acoustic, phonological, and semantic process-
ing. The variable of interest would not be the participants’ overall
performance on the each kind of probe, but rather, correlations
between performance on different probes for each stimulus for
each participant.
USE NEUROIMAGING TO TEST THE HYPOTHESES
Neuroimaging techniques present promising ways to test the
hypotheses and explore both processing trade-offs. According
to the hypothesis that narrowed attention can affect resource
deployment to different stages of processing, when compared with
neurotypical people, people withASCs should have increased acti-
vation of early processing areas, including those associated with
the input modalities of symbolic stimuli, coupled with decreased
activation of later processing areas. Thus, for visually presented
linguistic stimuli, one would expect greater activation in early
visual areas in ASC participants relative to controls, while for
auditorially presented linguistic stimuli, one would expect greater
activation in early auditory processing areas (Two caveats: if, as
suggested by Damasio, 1994, words and concepts have meaning
by reactivating early sensory processing areas associated with their
referents, one would have to distinguish between the activation of
sensory areas by sensory input and their reactivation by higher-
level schemas. Also, more generally, each technique has an indirect
relationship to neural activity, and such activity may not always
reﬂect attention or resource deployment).
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Existing neuroimaging work, much of it summarized in Sam-
son et al.’s (2012) meta-analysis, provides some support for
these predictions. For example, Just et al.’s (2004) ﬁnding of
increased activation in Wernicke’s area coupled with decreased
activation in Broca’s area during sentence processing in autistic
participants without intellectual disability may reﬂect a resource
tradeoff. Gaffrey et al.’s (2007) ﬁnding of increased activation in
the early visual areas of participants withASCs during the process-
ing of visually presented linguistic stimuli may reﬂect increased
activation of the input modality.
At shorter time-scales, the hypotheses also predict negative cor-
relations between the activation of early and late processing areas
in people with ASCs but not in controls. It is unclear, however,
whether resource allocation mechanisms act at short enough time
scales that functional connectivity techniques would ﬁnd such neg-
ative correlations; to my knowledge, no such results have been
reported.
FALSIFYING THE HYPOTHESES
Because of the difﬁculties of testing resource theories and themany
possible causes of the hypothesized atypical resource allocation, it
would be hard to disprove the hypotheses with a single, discon-
ﬁrmatory experiment. Nonetheless, convergent disconﬁrmatory
evidence would disprove the hypotheses, especially if it was found
in autistic people with strong sensory symptoms, who the theory
predicts are most likely to have atypical resource allocation as a
factor.
Two ﬁndings that would weigh against the hypothesis would
be similar performance by autistic people and controls on a
variety of dual-task experiments using different modalities and
levels of difﬁculty, and an absence of negative correlations in
autistic people among measures of performance at different
levels of processing of difﬁcult meaningful stimuli. In addi-
tion, ﬁndings supporting convincing alternative explanations of
phenomena focused on in this account (e.g., sensory hyper-
and hyposensitivity, difﬁculties with comprehension, and dif-
ﬁculties with action) would weaken the hypotheses for those
areas.
In terms of neuroimaging, assuming that the functions of brain
areas in autism are roughly similar to their functions in typi-
cal development, a ﬁnding that activation associated with earlier
stages is not increased or spared and that activation associatedwith
later stages of processing is not reduced would weigh against the
hypotheses.
CONCLUSION
I have presented two hypotheses about how atypical resource allo-
cation inASCs could affect perceptual processing, theprocessingof
meaningful stimuli, and the control of action. I have hypothesized
that, especially in autistic people with strong sensory symptoms,
attentional narrowing or reduced attentional capacity lead to atyp-
ical resource allocation both within perception and to different
stages of processing of stimuli. I have suggested that this atypi-
cal resource allocation contributes to autistic people’s difﬁculties
with language and social cognition, to their issues with executive
function and movement, to their atypical sensory and atten-
tional experiences, and to their perceptual/conceptual strengths
and weaknesses. Possible neural bases for atypical resource alloca-
tion include differences in the systems that control attention, the
cascading effects of intense sensory processing, and atypical con-
nectivity. Ways to test and reﬁne the hypotheses include dual-task
experiments and the use of experimentation and neuroimaging to
determine whether people with autism have negative correlations
between measures of different stages of processing.
The approach has a number of limitations; a few will be men-
tioned. First, the nature of the resources is left open; there are
many possible instantiations, and thus more possibilities to test.
Second, it’s hard to test resource theories; other phenomena such
as executive difﬁculties or cross-talk (interference) between pro-
cesses could lead to similar results. Thus, though the suggested
experiments would provide evidence for or against the hypothe-
ses, none of them is deﬁnitive, and convergent evidence is needed.
Some phenomena discussed here, such as aspects of EPF, may be
caused by structural differences such as altered lateral connectiv-
ity in early processing areas (Kéïta et al., 2011). Nevertheless, such
wiring differences may affect resource allocation at later stages,
helping explain more changeable aspects of autism such as the
experience of sensory ﬂuctuation. Finally, atypical resource allo-
cation is hypothesized to be only one factor in autism;many factors
are likely to contribute to the heterogeneity in ASCs.
Several other approaches to autism focus on strengths and
weaknesses in autism in a somewhat similar way. These include
approaches centered on complexity (e.g., Minshew and Goldstein,
1998), connectivity (e.g., Just et al., 2004), competition (Bonneh
et al., 2008), hyper-processing (Markram et al., 2007), and EPF
(e.g., Bertone et al., 2005; Mottron et al., 2006). Most of these
approaches are not mutually exclusive. For instance, it’s possible
that in autism, both reduced structural or functional connectivity
and atypical resource allocation lead to a reduction in the activa-
tion of higher-level processing areas. It’s also possible that different
subgroups of people with ASCs have different etiologies, but that
the increased activation of lower-level processing areas coupled
with diminished activation of higher-level processing areas is a
ﬁnal common pathway.
If the atypical resource allocation is found to be a factor in
many aspects of autism, we may be better able to understand
the causes and consequences of atypical sensory and attentional
experiences common in the syndrome, and to help people with
autism allocate their resources differently when they wish to.
We may be able to predict what makes stimuli easy or hard to
process in autism, and to use this information in designing edu-
cational programs for people with autism. Finally, we may be
better able to understand autistic people’s strengths as well as their
weaknesses.
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